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INSURANCE PROTECTION FOR PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND COMPLETED OPERATIONS -
WHAT EVERY LAWYER SHOULD KNOW
Roger C. Henderson*
There have been many recent changes in the field of tort law,'
but none as personal and important to each member of our so-
ciety as the changes in tort liability theories for injuries associated
with products and related services. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to conceive of an individual in America today who is not exposed to
some serious risk of injury from such a source, and, of course, the
source is likewise exposed to a correlative liability. It is this
latter exposure and the means of protecting against it that is the
subject of this article.
Although trial lawyers and judges are the natural objects of
an article dealing with anything so fraught with litigation, it is
hoped that the office practitioner will also find this of value in the
way of preventive law practice. Certainly not every manufacturer
that is sued on a products liability theory is a giant automobile
manufacturer or chemical company in a distant location. There
are many small and medium size manufacturers, not to mention
wholesalers and retailers, whether in the form of sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships or corporations, that are subject to suits for
products liability. One wonders how many of these entities are
aware of the extent of their exposure and whether they are prop-
B.B.A., 1960, University of Texas; LL.B., 1965, University of Texas;
LL.M., 1969, Harvard. Member of the Texas and American Bar Associa-
tions. Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
See R. KEETON, VENTUmIG To Do JusicE. (1969).
2 This exposure has but recently been labeled "products liability." As
long as the basis of liability of the source of the product was restricted
to negligence, the victim's cause of action was merely another personal
injury or property damage suit, and seemed to call for no special
name to distinguish it. Even the early food cases, e.g., Jacob E. Decker
& Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942), which recog-
nized strict liability against the manufacturer without regard to priv-
ity, were not given a special name. With the advent, however, of
strict liability as to defective products, whether one talks in terms of
warranties or RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 402A (1965), (see
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal Rptr. 697,
701, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962)), the term "products liability" developed
to denote, not necessarily a particular theory of action since all three
theories are subsumed by the term, but a certain class of cases in-
volving the marketing of unreasonably dangerous products. The term
"Products Hazard" has been used in insurance policies to denominate
the applicable coverage, regardless of theory of liability.
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erly protected by insurance. Because of the broad nature of the
exposure, the complexities of insurance coveragess and resulting
diversions in court decisions, the lawyer has a special obligation
to educate himself as to the problems in this area and counsel his
clients in regard thereto. One of the purposes of this article is to
help prepare the lawyer for that task.
I. PRODUCTS HAZARD AND COMPLETED OPERATIONS
A. DEVELOPmopET OF COVERAGE
The development of insurance protection for products liability,
denominated "Products Hazard" coverage, 4 has paralleled the de-
velopment of the modern rules for products liability.5 One writer
states that the coverage was offered as early as 1890,6 but it took
the burgeoning common law to bring it to its present full-blown
status.7 Prior to the expansion of the common law theories of
3 The policy provisions defining coverage for products liability and
completed operations led the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 105. N.H. 76, 83, 193 A.2d 444, 449 (1963)
to say: [Tihe plaintiff [insurer] gave the defendant coverage in a
single, simple sentence easily understood by the common man in the
market place. It attempted to take away a portion of this same cover-
age in paragraphs and language which even a lawyer, be he from
Philadelphia or Bungy, would find it difficult to comprehend." For
other cases criticising policy provisions in regard to such coverage,
see Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Aconomy Erectors, Inc., 224 F.2d
242, 247 (7th Cir. 1955); Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic
Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679, 691, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390, 433 P.2d
174, 180 (1967); Hays v. Pacific Indem. Group, 8 Cal. App. 3d 158, 163,
86 Cal. Rptr. 815, 817 (1970); Maretti v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 42 Ill.
App. 2d 17, 28, 190 N.E.2d 597, 602 (1963); American Sponge & Cham-
ois Co. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 749, 750, 287 N.Y.S.2d
199, 200 (1st Dep't 1968); Brainard v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 187
N.Y.S.2d 435, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
4 See note 2 supra.
5 See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 224 F.2d 293,
295 (3rd Cir. 1955); Nielson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 174 F. Supp. 648,
653 (N.D. Iowa 1959), aff'd on opinion below, 277 F.2d 455 (8th Cir.
1960).
6 "It appears that products liability insurance was first written in Eng-
land about 1890, to insure pie bakers against liability for accidents
that sometimes happened when roach powder inadvertently got into
pie dough. The insurance was known as 'poison insurance' in those
days. It is sometimes still called that." Andersen, Current Problems
On Products Liability Law and Products Liability Insurance, 31 INS.
CouNsEL J. 436, 441 (1964).
7 "In the present climate of the law, many modern manufacturers have
retreated from their former status as self-insurers. Products liability
insurance, cautiously and hesitantly written shortly before the mid-
Twenties as the result of demands of manufacturers for coverage, has
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liability for injuries arising from unreasonably dangerous products,
there was not much need for such insurance coverage. The manu-
facturer could only be sued for negligence, and this alone was an
insurmountable burden for the plaintiff in many cases. Even if
the plaintiff could marshal the necessary evidence, there was the
privity barrier. Thus, the greatest risk that a manufacturer suf-
fered, aside from employer's liability, was for injuries to third
persons arising out of conditions or activities on or near his prem-
ises and for operations away from such premises but related there-
to. Insurance protection for such risks was readily available in
the form of what is now called "Premises and Operations" cover-
age.8 This coverage, as indicated, however, applied only to injuries
occurring on, or adjacent to, the described premises,9 and during
the progress of operations away from the premises.'0 If the injury
occurred away from the premises and after operations had been
completed, there was no coverage."
By describing the premises and defining the operations of the
insured, the insurer limited the risks insured against. The premises
and operations coverage was not particularly designed to meet the
limited exposure of a manufacturer for products liability based
on negligence although it is clear that such an injury occurring
on the premises or during covered operations would be within
the policy terms. An injury resulting from a product or completed
operation away from the premises could only be said to be covered
under the premises and operations clause by manipulating the
word accident to mean the negligent act or omission instead of the
now become a major phase of insurance underwriting." Miller, Lia-
bility of a Manufacturer for Harm Done by a Product, 3 SYR. L. RLV.
106, 124 (1951).
8 For a general discussion of premises and operations coverage, see 7A
J. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAws AD PRACTICE §§ 4493.2, 4493.3 (1962).
9 See Graustein & Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., Ltd., 214 Mass.
421, 101 N.E. 1073 (1913), holding, in an action on a policy covering
injuries to third persons within or on the premises of insured, or ways
adjacent thereto, that the words "elsewhere in service of employers"
did not mean anywhere that the insured was engaged in doing any
of its business, but was confined to the location of insured's premises.
10 See Camden & Atl. Tel. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 227 Pa. 242, 75
A. 1077 (1910), construing coverage for telephone company's opera-
tions provided the injuries were suffered "during the immediate doing
of the work of construction."
11 See Kelly-Dempsey & Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 77 F.2d 85 (10th
Cir. 1935), holding indemnity policy insuring pipe line construction
company against liability for injuries resulting from business opera-
tions not to cover injury resulting from explosion of dynamite cap
left on pipe line by insured's employee, where at time of injury in-
sured had finished construction of pipe line and surrendered posses-
sion and control thereof.
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injury caused by such conduct. This construction was a departure
from accepted tort analysis and was easily blocked by defining the
word accident in the policy. Thus, with the fall of the privity re-
quirement and development of strict products liability, a new
coverage was in order. This coverage, products hazard coverage,
was supplied by simply adding to the existing premises and op-
erations coverage a provision for injuries caused by products away
from the premises and after the insured had relinquished posses-
sion-of them. At the same time, and usually under the same para-
graph entitled simply "Products Hazards"'-or "Products Hazards
(Including Completed Operations)," coverage was provided for
operations that had been completed or abandoned and which had
taken place away from the described premises. As will be discussed
later, this physical arrangement proved to be an unhappy choice
for insurance companies.
The above dichotomy in coverage was perpetuated in the original
standard Comprehensive General Liability policy adopted by most
casualty companies after World War 1H, and, with some refinements,
continued in the 1966 revised standard Comprehensive General
Liability policy produced by the underwriting and policy drafting
committees of the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau and the Na-
tional Bureau of Casualty Underwriters. In addition to the Com-
prehensive General Liability policy, one can obtain products hazard
and completed operations coverage in connection with the follow-
ing types of policies: (1) Comprehensive General-Automobile; (2)
Manufacturers' and Contractors' Liability; (3) Schedule Liability;
(4) Garage Liability; and (5) Owners', Landlords', and Tenants'.
This does not mean, however, that when one purchases one of the
above policies that products hazard and completed operations cov-
erage is automatically included. On the contrary, this coverage has
to be specifically purchased by the insured by so electing on the
face of ttIe policy or by purchasing an endorsement which either
adds the coverage to or deletes the exclusion of the coverage under
the basic policy. For example, the name of the standard Manufac-
turers' and Contractors' Liability policy would lead one to believe
that products hazard and completed operations coverage is in-
cluded, but, in fact, it is expressly excluded. Thus, one should be
very careful in counseling his client to ensure that the desired cov-
erage is obtained?2
12 By way of further clarification in analyzing policy forms, it is worth
noting that most insurers now have a form called the General Liability
Automobile Policy, which is a standard form and is referred to as the
Jacket. Included in the Jacket are the general definitions, conditions,
and other materials that apply to liability policies in general. The
Jacket is then assembled with standard inserts called Coverage Parts
to form a complete policy. These inserts provide the specific insurance
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B. THE ScOPE AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF PRODUCTS HAZARD
AN) COWLETE OPERATIONS COVERAGE
Prior to 1966, the typical products hazard provision, in its en-
tirety, appeared in most policies as follows:
Division 4. Products hazard
(1) The handling or use of, the existence of any condition in or
a warranty of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or
distributed by the named insured, other than equipment rented to
or located for use of others but not sold, if the accident occurs after
the insured has relinquished possession thereof to others and away
from the premises owned, rented or controlled by the insured or on
premises for which the classification stated in division 1 of the
declarations excludes any part of the foregoing;
(2) Operations, if the accident occurs after such operations have
been completed or abandoned at the place of occurrence thereof
and away from premises owned, rented or controlled by the in-
sured, except (a) pick-up and delivery, (b) the existence of tools,
uninstalled equipment and abandoned or unused materials and (c)
operations for which the classification stated in division 1 of the
declarations specifically includes completed operations; provided,
operations shall not be deemed incomplete because improperly or
defectively performed or because further operations may be re-
quired pursuant to a service or maintenance agreement.18
As previously explained this provision was designed to comple-
ment the premises and operations coverage by defining where the
latter stopped and where the products hazard and completed op-
erations coverage began.14 To illustrate how these coverages fit
together, assume a tire manufacturer owns some of its retail out-
lets or dealers and that it has a liability policy providing premises
and operations coverage, but excluding products. hazard and com-
pleted operations coverage. Assume further that a company-owned
dealer was engaged. in mounting a new tire on a customer's car at
the dealer's place of business and that the tire exploded due to a
defect in manufacture, injuring the customer who was standing
nearby. Even though the manufacturer would be subject to a cause
of action based on a products liability theory, the loss will come
coverage desired by the insured such as Comprehensive General Lia-
bility, Manufacturers' and Contractors' Liability, and Owners,' Land-
lords,' and Tenants' Liability. By proceeding in this fashion insurers
attempt to achieve standardization and efficiency,in underwriting
operations, but to those not familiar with the relationship, and non-
relationship, of the different parts of this type of policy arrangement,
it appears to be a successful attempt at obfuscation by insurers. See
note 3 supra.
18 1 CCH PRoDucTs LIAB. REP. 3530 (1970). See also Ocean Accid. &
Guar. Corp. v. Aconomy Erectors, 224 F.2d 242, 244-45 (7th Cir. 1955).
14 See Dixie Furniture Co. v. Central Surety & Ins. Co., 173 F. Supp. 862,
866 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
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under his premises and operations coverage. The same would be
true if the dealer relinquished possession of the tire to the customer,
but due to an innate instinct the customer stopped his car on the
edge of the dealer's premises and gave the tire a sharp kick only to
have it explode and injure him. Paragraph (1) of the products
hazard exclusion only comes into play where the dealer relinquishes
possession of the tire and the injury occurs away from his prem-
ises.15 From this it can be seen that the products hazard coverage
parallels the common law exposure in regard to products liability
only so far. The coverage is dependent on the location of the acci-
dent and the possession of the product, factors which are usually
irrelevant to the common law theories of products liability.
The above illustrates how paragraph (1) of the products hazard
provision relates to the premises and operations coverage. Unfor-
tunately, however, due to the language and location of paragraph
(2) of the products hazard provision, the relationship of that para-
graph to paragraph (1) and to the premises and operations cov-
erage is far from clear. If one construes the word "operations" in
its broadest sense, there is an unmistakable overlap between para-
graphs (1) and (2) because "operations" certainly encompasses
the "handling or use of" products. This can be shown by pursuing
the above illustration further. Assume the dealer receives a tele-
phone call from a customer who is stranded on the highway with
a blown-out tire. The dealer takes a new tire to the customer,
mounts it, and, as he drives away, the tire explodes and injures the
customer as the latter gives it a kick. This situation obviously in-
volves the handling or use of a product, but it can also be said to
involve an operation. Thus, it can fit just as comfortably under the
language of paragraph (1) or (2),16 and there appears to be no
15 Where a liquefied petroleum gas dealer sold propane gas which did
not contain the required odorizing agent, and which later exploded
when a match was ignited in a house which unknowingly had become
filled with the undetectable gas, the cause of action clearly fell within
the products hazard exclusion. Bramlett v. Pan American Fire & Cas.
Co., 391 P.2d 256 (Okla. 1964).
16 See Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co. v. Northwestern Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 879
(9th Cir. 1959), where the insured sold stove oil contaminated with
gasoline which later exploded on ignition. The court classified the
injury as arising out of a completed operation, but it would be just
as logical to say that the injury arose from handling or selling a pro-
duct, after possession was relinquished and away from the insured's
premises.
In Inductotherm v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 83 N.J. Super.
464, 200 A.2d 358 (L. Div. 1964), the manufacturer-insured supplied
defective ceramic crucibles for use in conjunction with an induction
melting unit which it leased. The bottoms failed on the crucibles,
splattering molten bronze on the persons using them. Even though
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advantage or disadvantage in selecting one or the other in this
case.17
Any time a person handles or uses goods or products which he
manufactures, sells, handles or distributes this involves an opera-
tion, but not all operations involve products as one normally thinks
of the word, and herein lies the source of the dispute as to how
paragraph (2) relates to the premises and operations coverage. As
one court has noted:
The products hazard provision does not usually give rise to unusual
difficulty as to liability insurance coverage where there is only in-
volved the manufacture or sale of what is commonly known and
regarded as a product. Where the transaction involves . .. the
erection of a structure and the contractor furnishes material for
the structure, greater difficulty is encountered as to liability in-
surance coverage under the products hazard provision. However,
when the contract involves .. the rendering of services which do
not involve the furnishing or supplying of any product or material,
the question of liability insurance coverage under the products
hazard provision becomes most difficult.8
The question that plagued the completed operations subdivision
embodied in paragraph (2) is: was it meant to cover pure service
operations? It was clear that paragraph (1) could only apply where
a product was involved. Paragraph (2) could also apply where pro-
ducts were involved in the operation, but was it limited to that sit-
uation? This became a very important question where products
hazard coverage was excluded from a comprehensive risk type
policy containing premises and operations coverage.19 Any opera-
the court decided that the accident was excluded because it involved
operations which were completed and away from the insured's premi-
ses, it surely arose out of a product which the insured handled or
distributed as defined in paragraph (1).
27 Because of the exception in paragraph (1) "other than equipment
rented to or located for use of others but not sold," paragraph (2)
would not duplicate the coverage in those fact situations unless one
reads this exception into paragraph (2), as did the court in Insurance
Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679, 63
Cal. Rptr. 382, 433 P.2d 174 (1967).
In some policies the exception is worded "but shall not include
any vending machine or any property . . . rented to or located for
use of others but not sold." See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 105 N.H.
76, 81, 193 A.2d 444, 448 (1963).
18 Nielson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 174 F. Supp. 648, 653-54 (N.D. Iowa
1959), aifd on opinion below, 227 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1960).
19 See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification
Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679, 685, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386, 443 P.2d 174, 178 (1967).
No case could be found where an insured had purchased products
hazard and completed operations coverage without also purchasing
premises and operations coverage, although this would be advisable,
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tions not specifically excluded would be covered. In resolving this
question great emphasis was usually placed on the fact that the
completed operations provision was a subdivision of the policy sec-
tion captioned either "Products, '20 "Products Hazard,"2 1 "Products-
Completed Operations,"2 2 or "Products Hazards (Including Com-
pleted Operations),"23 the inference being that the provision was
meant to cover only those operations which involved products in
the ordinary sense of the word.2 Other factors that influenced the
courts were: (1) the completed operations hazard was tied in by
hyphen, format and premium charge with the products hazard in
the description of risks section of the policy and one could not in-
sure against risks arising from completed operations separate and
apart from products liability;25 (2) the singular nature of the word
"Hazard" in "Products-Completed Operations Hazard; '2 6 (3) the
premium for the products and completed operations coverage was
determined by "the gross amount of money ... charged for all
goods and products sold; ' 27 (4) the language and arrangement of
the policy would lead the ordinary person to believe he had cover-
age for risks arising from completed operations;28 and, (5) at the
as where a business is being terminated. 1 CCH, PRoDucTs LIAB. REP.
3520 (1970). If this were the case, would a court say that there was
no coverage for service operations not involving products since the
products hazard and completed operations coverage dealt only with
products? Unless the court found the policy ambiguous this would
be the logical result
20 See, e.g., McAllister v. Century Indem. Co., 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.2d
345 (App. Div. 1953), aff'd mem., 12 N.J. 395, 97 A.2d 160 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
21 See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification
Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 433 P.2d 174 (1967).
22 See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So. 2d 877 (FIa.
Ct. App. 1964).
28 See, e.g., Clements v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 15 Ohio Misc. 252, 42
Ohio Op. 2d 355, 236 N.E;2d 799 (Ct. C.P. 1968).
24 Just what the courts mean by products "in the ordinary sense of the
word" is not susceptible to precise definition, but in Kammeyer v.
Concordia Telephone Co., 446 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Mo. Ct App. 1969),
the court said that "any effort to define 'product' as the end result of
any activity will be rejected ......
25 Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 105 N.H. 76, 82, 193 A.2d 444, 448 (1963);
McNally v. American States Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1962).
26 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So. 2d 877, 880 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1964).
27 Morris v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967).
28 Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal
2d 679, 691, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390, 433 P.2d 174, 182 (1967); Rafiner
Elevator Works v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 392 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Mo.
1965).
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very least, the policy was ambiguous and should be construed
against the insurance company.29
The majority of courts30 facing this issue followed the view that
the completed operations provision does not apply to an insured's
business if it involves services only, or if the product composes but
In Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pattee, 108 N.H. 298, 234 A.2d
537, 539 (1967), where the policy contained an endorsement defining
completed operations to include "any act or omission in connection
with operations performed by or on behalf of the named insured on
the premises or elsewhere, whether or not goods or products are in-
volved in such operations," the court still held that the provision
applied only to those operations involving products. "Since the 'inter-
pretative endorsement' is also boldly headed 'Products-Completed
Operations Hazard,' the insured would have no more reason to think
that it applied to him than he would the other provisions relating to
the same hazard."
29 Hoffman & Klemperer Co. v. Ocean Accid. & Guar. Corp., 292 F.2d
324, 328 (7th Cir. 1961).
so McNally v. American States Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1962)
(elevator maintenance service); Hoffman & Klemperer Co. v. Ocean
Accid. & Guar. Corp., 292 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1961) (cleaning and tuck-
pointing buildings); Nielson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 174 F. Supp. 648
(N.D. Iowa 1959), affd on opinion below, 277 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1960)(excavating for sewer); R & 0 Elevator Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp.,
194 F. Supp. 452 (D. Minn. 1960), aff'd, 293 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1961)
(elevator maintenance); Hercules Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 171 F.
Supp. 746 (S.D N.Y. 1959) (cleaning ship's hold); Insurance Co. of
North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 382, 433 P.2d 174 (1967) (cleaning swimming pool); Hays v. Pa-
cific Indem. Group, 8 Cal. App. 3d 158, 86 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1970) (instal-
lation of garage door); Miller Electric Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur.
Corp., 171 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Ct App. 1965) (installation of electrical
distribution system); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So.
2d 877 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964) (electrical contracting); Maretti v. Mid-
land Nat'l Ins. Co., 42 IlL App. 2d 17, 190 N.E.2d 597 (1963) (fire-
works exhibition); Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So. 2d 108
(1958) (installation of sewer system); Poynter v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
140 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (repair of heating system in trailer);
Swillie v. General Motors Corp., 133 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 1961)
(installation of brake line); King v. Mason, 95 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct.
App. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 234 La. 299, 99 So. 2d 117 (1958) (instal-
lation of sewer system); Rafiner Elevator Works v. Michigan Mut.
Liab. Co., 392 S.W-2d 240 (Mo. 1965) (elevator maintenance); Kam-
meyer v. Concordia Telephone Co., 446 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
(removing old telephone equipment); Morris v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 421 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (electrical wiring); Kissel v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (excavating
by general contractor); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pattee, 108 N.H.
298, 234 A.2d 537 (1967) (plumbing business); Peerless Ins. Co. v.
Clough, 105 N.. 76, 193 A.2d 444 (1963) (building contractor); Mc-
Allister v. Century Indem. Co., 24 NJ. Super. 289, 94 A.2d 345 (App.
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a minimal part of the business,3 ' despite the fact that in so doing
it made the completed operations provision redundant to the cov-
erage already provided in paragraph (1).32 The minority took the
position, for which the insurance companies argued, that the com-
pleted operations provision covered all types of operations regard-
less of the involvement of a product.33 The latter view is more in
keeping with the intent of the drafters of the policy terms, and,
notwithstanding the ambiguity that might have been created by
the arrangement of the policy provisions, it is more in keeping
with the basic concept that the products hazard and completed
operations coverages only apply when the insured is finished with
the product or through with operations.34
Div. 1953, aff'd mem., 12 N.J. 395, 97 A.2d 160 (Brennan, J. dissent-
ing) (excavating and installation of oil tank under sidewalk); John-
son v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 983, 289 N.Y.S.2d 852
(Sup. Ct. 1968) (building contractor); Clements v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 15 Ohio Misc. 252, 42 Ohio Op. 2d 355, 236 N.E.2d 799 (Ct. C.P.
1968) (backfilling ditch). See Gehrlein Tire Co. v. American Emp.
Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 348 F.2d
918 (3d Cir. 1965) (mounting tires on rims).
31 Similarly, if the business of the insured may be severed into opera-
tions not related to a product, only those operations that do involve
a product are subject to the completed operations provision. Insurance
Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679,
691, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390, 433 P.2d 174, 182 (1967).
32 "The Kendrick decision [following the majority rule] not only ignores
the express language of the 'operations' definition under 'Products
Hazard' but also renders that whole definition of no effect when con-
sidering the activities as here of a construction contractor." Neumann
v. Wisconsin Nat. Gas Co., 27 Wis. 2d 410, 423, 134 N.W.2d 474, 481
(1965). See also Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp. 892, 898
(D. Ore. 1963).
33 Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 397 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1968) (drill repair
service); Orchard v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ore.
1964) (automobile parts business); American Policyholders' Ins. Co.
v. McClinton, 100 N.J. Super. 169, 241 A.2d 462 (Ch. Div. 1968) (plumb-
ing business); Neumann v. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co., 27 Wis. 2d 410,
134 N.W.2d 474 (1965) (excavation); Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Snow,
222 F. Supp. (D. Ore. 1963) (fumigating ship's hold); Clauss v. Amer-
ican Auto & Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (sewer construc-
tion). See Smedley Co. v. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 143 Conn.
510, 123 A.2d 755 (1956) (operation of public warehouse); Dickert v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 760, 175 S.E.2d 98 (1970) (installation of
home appliances); Baker v. Maryland Cas. Co., 73 R.I. 411, 56 A.2d
920 (1948) (cesspool cleaning); Butler v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 197 Tenn. 614, 277 S.W.2d 348 (1955) (repairing residences); Pan
American Ins. Co. v. Cooper Butane Co., 157 Tex. 102, 300 S.W.2d 651
(1957) (installing, servicing and repairing liquified petroleum gas sys-
tems).
34 Andersen, Current Problems in Products Liability Law and Products
Liability Insurance, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 436, 442 (1964).
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The basis for the ambiguity discussed above lies in the way the
parties to the insurance view their exposure to the risk. An insurer
that writes an ordinary public liability policy does not want a risk
extending without end as a result of work performed or merchan-
dise sold.35 The underwriting considerations are different for this
type of risk which, in turn, give rise to different premium rates.36
On the contrary, a businessman does not necessarily think of his
exposure on this basis and expects his insurance to cover any in-
juries arising out of an operation or product, regardless of whether
he is finished with it. He does not categorize his association with
the operation or product as does his insurer. While the dichotomy
is logical to the insurer, it is arbitrary to the insured, and not one
which he would usually expect. Thus, an insurer has a duty in
drafting its policies to clearly delineate the hazards which it pur-
ports to protect against.
In the 1966 revision of the standard Comprehensive General
Liability policy; the insurance industry has taken steps to eliminate
the confusion caused by tying the completed operations provision
to the products hazard provision. In the revised standard policy
the description of hazards lists completed operations and products
as separate hazards to be insured against. The premium for the
former is based on receipts while the premium for the latter is
based on sales. Moreover, the definition of each hazard is separated
completely from the other. To date there are no cases reported
construing the new provisions, but the above changes would seem
to meet the objections that were raised in regard to the old
policies 7
C. PRODUCTS LiAmiY COVERAGE
1. Risks Included In Products Hazards
When the products hazard provision was originally designed to
include both protection for risks arising from products and com-
pleted operations it was not so important to define exactly what
risks in regard to products were intended to be covered. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, it became very important to know
whether or not a product was involved, but once it was determined
that there was a product involved very little attention was devoted
to whether it fell under paragraph (1) or (2) because both were
35 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTicE § 4508, at 98 (1962).
86 Id.; Sorensen, What a Lawyer Ought to Know About Products Liabil-
ity Insurance Coverage, 1968 TrIAL LAWYES Gume 322, 326 (1968).
s7 It should be pointed out that not all insurers use the same forms, but
there is a great deal of uniformity because most companies are mem-
bers of or subscribe to rating boards, such as the Mutual Insurance
Rating Bureau and National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, and
use the forms promulgated by these organizations.
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usually interpreted to cover risks arising from products. If a re-
tailer committed an act of negligence in selling or delivering a per-
fectly good product, this conduct could be classified as a risk aris-
ing out of the handling of a product or an operation. The retailer
either had both coverages or neither since they were always sold
together.
Under the 1966 revision, it is now possible to buy one coverage
without the other and it has now become very important for the
insured to know exactly what risks each of these two coverages
purports to protect against. It is clear that the new products hazard
provision will protect against defective products, breached warran-
ties and misrepresentations s8 and it should now be clear that the
new completed operations provision covers services not involving
goods or products. 9 But what coverage should our negligent re-
tailer mentioned above have? Should he have purchased only the
products hazard coverage or should he have also purchased the
completed operations coverage? He cannot answer these questions
until he knows exactly what risks are covered by each. At present
there is no clear answer.40
The language adopted by insurers in defining the risks insured
against under the products hazard provision has been the source of
differing opinions. The early policies provided:
This policy does not cover any accident... caused directly or in-
directly by the possession, consumption, handling or use, else-
where than upon the premises described in the schedule of state-
ments, of any goods, article or produce, manufactured, handled
or distributed by the assured unless covered hereunder by written
permit endorsed on this policy.4 1
38 The revised standard products hazard coverage protects against "bodily
injury and property damage arising out of the named insured's pro-
ducts or reliance upon a misrepresentation or warranty made at any
time with respect thereto."
39 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
40 By solving one problem, whether the completed operations provision
applied to services not involving goods orproducts, the insurers have
exposed another problem. Perhaps the insurance industry had the
correct approach originally by combining the two coverages and sell-
ing it under the one heading, but erred only in the name identifying
it. The objections raised by the courts might have been met by chang-
ing the name to "Completed Operations (Including but not limited
to Products Hazards)." Another alternative would have been to in-
clude both coverages in one paragraph reading: "Operations, includ-
ing but not limited to those involving goods or products of the named
insured after possession has been relinquished, if such operations have
been completed or abandoned at the place of occurrence thereof, and
away from premises, etc."
41 See Loveman, Joseph & Loeb v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 233 Ala.
518, 520, 173 So. 7, 8 (1937).
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This language was subsequently simplified by referring to accidents
caused by "the handling or use of, the existence of any condition
in or a warranty of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled
or distributed by the named insured."'' Some shortened it even
further by merely referring to accidents caused by "goods or pro-
ducts manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the named
insured."48
The words "handling or use of" would seem to include any
theory of tort liability in regard to a product which caused bodily
injury or property damage away from the premises and after the
insured relinquished possession of it. Yet, it was not infrequently
argued that the negligence *of one in handling or using a product
in which he dealt was independent of and unrelated to the product,
even though one cause in fact of the injury was the product. The
end to be achieved by such an argument was, of course, that the
products hazard exclusion was inapplicable. For example, in Lessak
v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co." it was argued that there
was no defective condition in the product, nor any breach of war-
ranty, and that the negligence of the storeowner in selling ammuni-
tion for a BB gun to a minor was not excluded by the products
hazard provision. The court accepted this argument, and in so
doing gave a narrow construction to the products hazard provision
to the effect that it did not apply to mere negligence in the sale of
a product as this was not a risk inherent in the product itself. The
latter risk, however, was already covered by the language "the
existence of any condition in or a warranty of goods or products."
Thus, the result of the decision was to delete the words "the hand-
ling or use of' from the policy.46
42 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
48 See Diversified Products Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 355 F.2d 846 (6th
Cir. 1966).
44 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730 (1958).
45 For another court indicating approval of this view, see Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 214 F.2d 418 (8th
Cir. 1954) (where it was alleged, inter alia, that coal was negligently
loaded on a railroad car so that when an attempt was made to open
the door, it fell off causing severe personal injuries, and the court held
that such negligence was not related to the insured's product). But see
Mohawk Valley Fuel Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 445, 165
N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (negligent delivery of fuel to wrong
address, which resulted in a fire when fuel was discharged through an
intake valve onto the cellar floor, was held to be 'andling" of a pro-
duct); Bitts v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. -Corp., 282 F.2d 542
(9th Cir. 1960) (failure to warn of the characteristics of refrigerator
coil'and dangerous conseluences of opening same constituted negli-
gence arising out of the handling of a product). See also Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 177 F.2d 249, 251 (7th
Cir. 1949) (where the court refused to limit the products hazard pro-
vision to risks arising out of defective productsY.
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Although there have been other cases 46 which have carried the
narrow construction in Lessak over to those policies which define
the products hazard as risks "arising out of goods or products
manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the named insured"
the more tenable approach was taken in Hagen Supply Corp. v.
Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co.47 This case involved a mail
order house which was found to be negligent in selling a tear gas
device to a minor. In answer to the argument that the products
hazard provision should be limited to defective products, the court
rejected the Lessak position and held that there were many acts
or omissions that would subject a manufacturer or seller to liability,
to wit: failure to warn, defective workmanship, negligent design,
illegal sale, misrepresentation, inadequate testing, and inherently
dangerous objects. The court thus concluded that the illegal sale of
the tear gas device was within the products hazard provision.
By giving the products hazard provision a broad construction
so that it covers any injury caused in fact by a product manufac-
tured, sold, handled or distributed by the insured, one eliminates
the near hopeless task of trying to determine if the injury falls
within a risk arising out of the product itself.48 Moreover, it will
be consistent with what the insured reasonably expects to receive
by way of insurance coverage. A retailer would be covered by the
In Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co. v. Northwest Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 879,
881-82 (9th Cir. 1959), the insured delivered contaminated fuel oil
when his truck driver failed to clean a hose which had previously
been used to pump gasoline. The oil exploded and the insured argued
that the injured party's "allegations of negligence are directed to the
use of faulty equipment or the negligence of the truck driver and do
not pertain to a product of the insured or a defect in a product manu-
factured by the insured;" thus they fell outside the products hazard
exclusion. The court held that "whatever pre-existing negligence may
have occurred, the immediate cause of the accident was the handling
and use of the insured's contaminated product away from the in-
sured's premises and after the insured had relinquished possession."
46 See McGinnis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 276 Cal. App. 2d 15, 80 Cal. Rptr.
482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (insured sold gun powder to fifteen year old
boy); Thibodeaux v. Parks Equip. Co., 140 So. 2d 215 (La. Ct. App.
1962) (failure to warn of characteristics of valve and failure to give
proper instructions for installation and use of same); Brant v. Citi-
zens Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 4 Mich. App. 596, 145 N.W.2d 410 (1966) (in-
sured delivered different type of stove than one ordered, resulting in
asphyxiation).
47 331 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1964).
49 Once liability is established under tort law where a product is the
cause in fact of the injury, one should not look further to determine
whether the loss falls within the products hazard provision if the
accident happens after the insured has relinquished possession of the
product and away from the premises. To hold otherwise will lead to
analysis so abstruse as to rival that found in proximate cause.
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products hazard provision regardless of whether he negligently
sells to a minor, as above, sells or delivers a product different from
that requested,49 or fails to warn in regard to a dangerous charac-
teristic.50 All of these are commonly termed products liability cases
even though the product itself may be perfect. A supplier of pro-
ducts should be covered for these risks when he purchases coverage
denominated products hazard, and should understand that he has no
such coverage if he refuses it. This would leave the completed op-
erations provision to cover those services not involving products
and any duplication in coverage between the two would be avoided.
If this construction is not followed, a prospective insured dealing
with products would have to take both coverages to be sure he is
fully protected and this he should not be required to do. The pro-
ducts hazard provision should not be limited to certain classes of
transactions involving the insured and his products, but should be
extended to all hazards related to an insured's products which
actually cause injuries away from the insured's premises and after
possession of the products is relinquished by him.
2. What Constitutes Goods or Products Manufactured, Sold,
Handled or Distributed By the Insured?
What are "goods or products"? These two words standing alone
have a meaning which is most commonly associated with the com-
mercial world. They are most often thought of as some tangible or
material units in which one trades. The qualifying words "manu-
factured, sold, handled51 or distributed" really do not broaden the
ordinary meaning associated with these words, but limit "goods or
49 See, e.g., Orchard v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 564 (1964)
aff'd per curiam, 340 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1965) (delivery of different
rear axle bearing from that ordered held to be within products hazard
provision). See aZso American Emp. Ins. Co. v. Knox-Tenn Equip Co.,
52 Tenn. App. 643, 377 S.W.2d 573 (1963) (furnishing wrong size drill
bits covered by products hazard provision).
50 See, e.g., Inductotherm Corp. v. New Jersey Mrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 83
N.J. Super. 464, 200 A.2d 358 (L. Div. 1964) (failure to warn of danger
inherent in use of product within products hazard provision).
51 The word "handled" standing alone does not necessarily have the
commercial connotation associated with the others, but, because of the
basis of the liability the products hazard provision is designed to pro-
tect against, it is reasonable to give it a construction consistent with
the others. For such an interpretation see Smedley Co. v. Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 143 Conn. 510, 515, 123 A.2d 755, 758 (1956) where
the court held that the intent of the drafters was to restrict the word
"handled" to mean "to buy and sell; to deal, or trade, in."
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products" to those in which the insured trades or deals.52 This is
best illustrated in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hercules Powder
Co.5 where a sealed aluminum tube was, in its use by the insured,
repeatedly plunged into a mass of molten explosive material for
experimental purposes. Thereafter the tube was sent to another
concern to have work performed on it and was to be returned to
the insured upon completion of this work. While the work was being
performed the tube exploded. In answer to the insurer's argument
that the tube constituted goods or a product handled by the insured
the court pointed out that the basis of products liability was the
responsibility placed on one who sends goods or products out into
the channels of trade for use by others and that a piece of equip-
ment sent by a manufacturer to a laboratory for processing was
not such goods or product. The court likened the tube to a wrench
or jack or any other of the numerous pieces of paraphernalia about
a laboratory or factory.
While the Hercules case shows that it is necessary to actually
trade or deal in an item, it is not necessary that this be the product
or goods in which one primarily deals. In Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. GuinP a bottled gas dealer provided empty gas cylinders at
his cost to customers without any obligation to return them regard-
less of whether they purchased gas from the dealer to fill them.
When one of these bottles exploded it was held to be "goods" under
the Alabama Sales Act, and, therefore, to be within the products
hazard provision. In fact, it has been held that even a brief excur-
52 See Gehrlein Tire Co. v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 577
(W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1965) (tire
dealer who mounted tires on rims, both of which were brought to him
by a customer, was not engaged in manufacturing, selling, handling,
or distributing a product); Smedley Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 143 Conn. 510, 123 A.2d 755 (1956) (public warehouse operator
who delivered from storage different product than ordered was not
engaged in manufacturing, selling, handling or distributing preducts);
Swillie v. General Motors Corp., 133 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 1961)(original manufacturer of Natchez Double Loadster was not engaged
in manufacturing, selling, handling or distributing a product while
installing a Loadster for a third party who purchased it from inter-
mediate source); Lieberman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 284 App.
Div. 1051, 135 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1954), motions for reargument and leave
to appeal denied, 285 App. Div. 830, 137 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1955) (hubcap
replaced after repairing flat tire was not a product manufactured,
sold, handled, or distributed by service station operator); Philadel-
phia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Grandview, 42 Wash. 2d 357, 255 P.2d
540 (1953) (city did not manufacture, sell, handle or distribute me-
thane gas which, as a result of city's negligence, was allowed to enter
homes through city water mains).
58 224 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1955).
54 370 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 910 (1967).
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sion into the stream of commerce will cause one to be classified as
a manufacturer, seller, handler or distributor of goods or products
regardless of how foreign this occasional venture may be to his
normal activities. In Smith -v. Maryland Casualty Co.,55 the court
held that a sling shot sold at a church bazaar was a product sold
by the church and coverage was excluded by the products hazard
provision when the sling shot broke, 'causing personal injuries.
Thus, it can be seen that the stream of commerce -has some unex-
pected bends in it.
Certainly the court in Hercules was sound in relying on the
common law basis of products liability for its decision, and this
should continue to be the approach for determining what consti-
tutes "goods or products." As the common law changes, the insur-
ance protection should change with it. For example, who would
have thought a decade ago that a house might be classified as a
product for purposes of imposing strict liability for defecfs on the
builder? Yet, this has happened56 because of changes in the home
building industry. At one time most houses were built for the land-
owner by a contractor on an individual basis and houses were not
considered a product.5T Today when many homes are built by de-
velopers and contractors on subdivided property which they own
and then sold on the open market, there is no reason not to think
of such hbuses as products, and these should come under the pro-
ducts hazard provision.58
In order to complete the discussion of the definition of "goods
or products" two policy provisions need to be briefly mentioned.
Prior to 1966 some policies 9 provided that goods or products in-
55 246 Md. 485, 229 A.2d 120 (1967).
56 See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); House v.
Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969).
57 See Kissel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct App.
1964).
58 See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 105 N.H. 76, 82, 103 A.2d 444, 448
(1963) (where the court noted, in holding the insured building con-
tractor did not deal in products, that he was building houses on a cost-
plus basis on land owned by others). But see Johnson v. Nat'l Union
Fire Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 983, 289 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (where
the court refused to recognize any distinction based on whether the
insured built houses under contract on land owned by another as op-
posed to building houses on his own land and then transferring the
improved property to purchasers, and held: "Though houses built
constitute part of the gross national 'product' and in the broad sense
of the word are the 'product' of the labor of the various trades en-
gaged in their construction, they are not 'products' in common par-
lance." Id. at 990, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 858.).
59 For such a policy, see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwin, 370 F.2d 297 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 910 (1967).
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cluded any container thereof, other than a vehicle.60 This has been
carried forward in the 1966 revised standard forms and should
cover any container, regardless of whether it is the immediate con-
tainer, such as a bottle, or a secondary container, such as a paper
carton which contains the bottle which in turn contains the goods
or product. The second provision deals with goods or products
which are furnished for use of others, but not sold, such as rented,
leased or bailed equipment or property. The 1966 revised standard
policies carry forward this exception by using the language" 'named
insured's products' shall not include a vending machine or any
property.. [613 rented to or located for use of others but not sold."
Thus, even though the courts have held that persons engaged in
the equipment rental or leasing business are subject to products
liability actions,62 the products hazard coverage is not what such a
person should purchase for protection. He would be protected under
a premises and operations provision3 and this is what he should
buy.
3. Relinquishment of Possession
The word "possession" in the phrase "relinquishment of posses-
sion" in the products hazard provision was a source of dispute in
the pre-1966 policies. Was it sufficient that the insured relinquished
physical control, sometimes referred to as custody, or did he also
have to relinquish his proprietary rights of control? There was no
unanimity on the answer to this question. There were two authori-
tative cases that considered this problem and, even though they in-
volved almost identical facts, they reached opposite results. In 1960
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided General Casualty Co.
60 For a discussion of what constitutes a "vehicle," see Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp. v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 214 F.2d 418 (8th
Cir. 1954).
61 Containers are excepted.
62 See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 85 Cal Rptr. 178, 466
P.2d 722 (1970) (holding commercial lessor or bailor of chattels to be
subject to strict products liability actions).
63 In Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67
Cal. 2d 679, 686, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386, 433 P.2d 174, 178 (1967), the
court rejected the insurer's argument that the exception of rented
produqcts from the products hazard provision contemplated an absolute
exclusion from any coverage whatsoever under the comprehensive
risk policy in question, and that additional protection must be pur-
chased to insure a risk of liability related to rented goods. The court
concluded "that since rented products are excepted from the products
hazard exclusion, they come within the general coverage." Accord,
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Loxahatchee Marina, Inc., 236 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Ct. App.
1970).
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v. Azteca Films, Inc." which involved the sale by the insured of
used motion picture films to a cellulose scrap dealer. The insured
would ship the used film to the dealer in containers owned by the
latter and it was the practice of the dealer to examine the used film,
pay for what he could use and destroy the remainder. In this case
the insured had delivered the film to a common carrier and it caught
fire destroying certain property. Physical possession had been re-
linquished by the insured, but title had not passed to the dealer
at the time of the loss. Applying California law the court determined
that the policy should be interpreted as understood by a reasonably
prudent person and that under this test the word "possession" con-
tained no ambiguity, but would be understood to mean actual or
physical possession.65
Six years later the Second Circuit held, with one dissent, in a
factually similar case, National Screen Service Corp. v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 68 that under New York law there
was an ambiguity in the word "possession" as used in the policy
and that the New York courts would give a broad construction to
it so as to include constructive as well as actual possession.67 The
Azteca case was the sounder of the two if one approaches the ques-
tion from the standpoint of what an ordinary insured under this
type of policy would expect. A lawyer might be expected to under-
stand the difference between custody and possession, but to most
people they are synonymous. Moreover, this interpretation was
more in keeping with the overall design of the products hazard
provision. It was the insurers who chose to make a distinction in
coverage based on where the accident happened and whether or
6 278 F.2d 161 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960).
65 The court buttressed this interpretation by noting that the products
hazard provision contained an exception as to "equipment or other
property rented to or located for the use of others but not sold," and
reasoned that if one construed the word "possession" to mean con-
structive possession it would render this exception "nugatory if not
absurd, for if the exclusion must relate to property 'sold' and off the
premises, it is completely unnecessary to except therefrom property
rented to or located for the use of others but not sold." Id. at 168. The
court concluded by saying that the inescapable implication was that
there were certain types of unsold property other than equipment
rented to or located for use of others, as here, which were meant to
be excluded by the products hazard provision.
66 364 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 958 (1966).
67 For other cases construing the word "possession" to mean construc-
tive possession as well as actual possession, see Canadian Radium &
Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 348 Ill. App. 171, 108 N.E.2d 515
(1952); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Firemen's Fund Inden. Co., 44 Wash.
2d 488, 268 P.2d 654 (1954).
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not the insured was through with the product or operation.6 8 From
an underwriting standpoint the mere passage of the proprietary
right to control would not appear to have had any effect on costs
of investigation and settlement of claims. It was not legal title
that concerned the insurers; it was the added burden of administer-
ing claims when the insured was not around to help with the pro-
cess that counted. If the passage of legal title, that is, the relinquish-
ment of the proprietary right to control, was the test, then it
would be possible for title to pass and the insured still have physical
possession of the property, and surely this was not a "relinquish-
ment of possession" within the meaning of the policy.6 9
In any event the insurance industry has taken steps to solve
this problem by inserting the word "physical" immediately prior
to the word "possession" in the 1966 revised standard provisions
and for those companies adopting these forms their intent should
be abundantly clear.
D. COMPLETED OPERATIONS
Prior to 1966 there was diversion in court decisions as to whether
the completed operations provision applied to pure service opera-
tions or merely to those service operations involving goods or
products.7 0 The insurance industry has attempted to clear up this
problem by rearranging the policy provisions,71 and, as it was pre-
viously submitted, the completed operations provision should now
be construed to cover only those operations which do not involve
goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by
the insured.7 2 This would leave the products hazard provision to
cover any injury which is caused in fact by a product, and, thus
hopefully simplify, at least from the insured's standpoint, what
could otherwise become a very confusing and misleading situation.
With this perspective of the completed operations hazard, one needs
to turn to another problem which has arisen under this provision:
when is an operation completed? In the early policies there was
no elaboration on what was meant by the seemingly innocent word
"completed," but the question was soon raised.
Where an insured begins an operation and the evidence shows
that it is still in progress, as in Lloyd's Casualty Insurer v. Mc-
Crary73 the answer is self-evident. In that case the insured installed
68 See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
69 See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Horn Lumber Co., 283 F. Supp. 365
(W.D. Ark. 1968).
70 See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
71 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
72 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
73 149 Tex. 172, 229 S.W.2d 605 (1950).
INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY
a butane gas system in a house, but the pressure gauge, valve and
fittings on the gas storage tanks did not operate properly. The in-
sured knew this and- intended to return to the home and correct
these defects, but in the meantime fire resulted from a leak in the
system, destroying the home. The combination of the deficiencies
and the insured's intentions clearly showed the job was not com-
pleted, and therefore was not excluded7 4
Had the insured in McCrary thought that he was through and
not intended to return, however, regardless of the defects or his
knowledge of such, some courts under the early policies would
have held that the operation was not complete because of the exist-
ing defects. In Daniel v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company75 the
insured, a plumber, was employed to convert a hot water heater
so that it could be used as a stove or room heater. In performing
the work the insured sealed the water tank, but left some water
inside. The work was accepted and paid for by the customer. Upon
lighting the heater the water turned to steam, expanded, and caused
the heater to explode, seriously injuring the customer's wife. The
court, in construing the completed operations clause, said:
Completion is an independent fact which cannot be determined
by the act or intention of a workman who may cease work regard-
ing the job as completed, nor wholly by the conduct of the owner
who without knowledge of the condition pays off before actual
completion....
We do not consider that the work is complete within the mean-
ing of the insurance contract so long as the workman has omitted
or altogether failed to perform some substantial requirement es-
sential to its functioning, the performance of which the owner still
has a contractual right to demand.7 6
The Daniel case was not cited by the New York Court of Appeals
two years later when it took the opposite view on this issue in
Berger Brothers Electric Motors, Inc. v. New Amsterdam Casualty
CoZ7 In this case the insured negligently connected electrical wir-
ing so that the motors and fans on certain turkey egg incubators
74 For other cases where the operations were held not to be completed,
see General Cas. Co. v. Larson, 196 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1952) (cleaning
and servicing furnace); Connecticut Co. v. Mongillo, 144 Conn. 200, 128
A.2d 528 (1957) (removal of trolley poles and filling holes); Arnold
v. Edelman, 393 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. 1965) (installation of revolving
doors); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hetner, 254 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) (temporary installation of gas heating unit); Boeing Air-
plane Co. v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 44 Wash. 2d 488, 268 P.2d
654 (1954) (modifying aircraft under government contract).
75 221 N.C. 75, 18 S.E.2d 819 (1942).
76 Id. at 77, 18 S.E.2d at 820.
77 293 N.Y. 523, 58 N.E.2d 717 (1944).
436 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 3 (1971)
operated in the wrong direction, resulting in the ruin of 17,000
turkey eggs. The court held that the work was completed within
the terms of the policy at the time of the accident:
This must be so unless we yield to the plaintiffs contention and
hold that the work was not completed at that time because the
wiring was defective; but so to construe the language of the ex-
cluding clauses would deprive them of all meaning and purpose.
By these clauses the parties intended to limit the casualty comp-
any's liability to accidents occurring during the progress of the
work and to exclude liability for accidents occurring, after the
work was completed, as the result of defective workmanship. If
that be not the meaning of the plain language used, the insurer
would remain liable indefinitely for defective workmanship upon
the theory that defective work is never complete until the defect
is discovered and corrected.78
In view of the fact that liability without fault for injuries re-
sulting from services has yet to be imposed in this country, the
Berger view has to be the correct one if the completed operations
provision applies to pure service operations. If one were covered
elsewhere, as under the premises and operations coverage, for risks
contemplated under the completed operations clause, that is, lia-
bility for faulty work that has been completed, there would never
be any need for purchase of this coverage by one who renders
services not involving products. In other words, the only time lia-
bility is going to be imposed is when fault is involved in the oper-
ation and if fault prevents the operation from being complete, the
coverage is illusory.
Despite the Berger decision some courts continued to follow the
view espoused in Daniel,7" which caused the insurance companies
to add the following proviso to the completed operations section:
"[O]perations shall not be deemed incomplete because improperly
or defectively performed or because further operations may be re-
quired pursuant to a service or maintenance agreement." This was
not entirely satisfactory8 0 so in the 1966 revision the question of
78 Id. at 527, 58 N.E.2d at 718.
79 See Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Schantz, 186 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1951)
(negligent repair of hoist rendered work incomplete); Hercules Co. v.
Royal Indem. Co., 171 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (negligence in
cleaning ship's hold resulting in clogged bilge pumps prevented work
from being complete). For cases rejecting this view, see Baker v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 73 R.I. 411, 56 A.2d 920 (1948) (negligenece in
improperly replacing lid on cesspool after cleaning); Butler v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 197 Tenn. 614, 277 S.W.2d 348 (1955)
(negligence in repairing porch).
50 In Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Fratarcangelo, 201 Va. 672, 112 S.E.2d 892
(1960), the court ignored the new clause in the completed operations
provision and held: "ITihe 'operation' which consisted of the alleged
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when an operation is completed received very thorough treatment.
There is little room for controversy under the new provision which
now reads:
"[Clompleted operations hazard" includes bodily injury and prop-
erty damage arising out of operations or reliance upon a repre-
sentation or warranty made at any time with respect thereto but
only if the bodily injury or property damage occurs after such
operations have been completed or abandoned and occurs away
from premises owned by or rented to the named insured. "Opera-
tions" include materials, parts or equipment furnished in connec-
tion therewith. Operations shall be deemed completed at the
earliest of the following times:
(1) When all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the
named insured under the contract have been completed,
(2) when all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the
named insured at the site of the operations have been completed,
or
(3) when the portion of the work out of which the injury or
damage arises has been put to its intended use by any person or
organization other than another contractor or subcontractor en-
gaged in performing operations for a principal as a part of the
same project.
Operations which may require further service or maintenance
work, or correction, repair or replacement because of any defect
or deficiency, but which are otherwise complete, shall be deemed
completed.
In connection with the 1966 revised standard completed opera-
tions provision two things should be pointed out. First, the clause
"or reliance upon a representation or warranty made at any time
with respect thereto" was added to cover the situation where some
negligent act of plugging the outlets in the stove, was not 'completed'
until King, to whom the stove was sold, had an opportunity to put
it to use." See also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Town of Pound
Ridge, 362 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1966) (ice and snow had been removed
from streets, but the court held that the job was not completed be-
cause the city would periodically check to see if the streets needed
to be sanded); Vito v. General Mut. Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 289,
223 N.Y.S.2d 431 (3d Dep't 1962) (insured agreed to keep a customer's
propane tanks filled, as well as service and examine the tanks from
time to time and the court held that, when further operations are
constantly required, this situation is not covered by the new pro-
vision).
An earlier problem evidenced by Heyward v. American Cas. Co.,
129 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.S.C. 1955) had not been resolved either. The in-
sured in that case had a contract to do plumbing work on a multi-
unit housing project. Units were occupied as they became usable. An
explosion occurred in one of the occupied units in which the work
had been completed and the court held that the work in all the units
had to be completed before the completed operations provision would
apply.
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courts were holding that a misrepresentation or warranty could
not be considered as completed until acted upon by the person
to whom it was made.8 ' This was an intolerable construction since
injury and reliance were simultaneous and thus always occurred
prior to an operation being completed. There should be no doubt
now that misrepresentations and warranties in regard to operations
are included if that operation is otherwise complete. Second, the
revised standard provision does not include bodily injury or prop-
erty damage arising out of:
(a) operations in connection with the transportation of property,
unless the bodily injury or property damage arises out of a
condition in or on a vehicle created by the loading or un-
loading thereof,
(b) the existence of tools, uninstalled equipment or abandoned
or unused materials, or
(c) operations for which the classification stated in the policy
or in the company's manual specifies "including completed
operations."
These excepted situations will be covered under the premises and
operations provision.
II. "BUSINESS RISK" EXCLUSION
In the 1966 revision a new provision, commonly referred to as
the "Business Risk" exclusion, was added to the products hazard
.and completed operations coverages. This provision excludes:
bodily injury or property damage resulting from the failure of the
named insured's products or work completed by or for the named
insured to perform the function or serve the purpose intended
by the named insured, if such failure is due to a mistake or de-
ficiency in any design, formula, plan, specifications, advertising
material or printed instructions prepared or developed by any
insured; but this exclusion does not apply to bodily injury or
property damage resulting from the active malfunctioning of such
products or work.
'This exclusion attempts to eliminate from the products hazard and
completed operations coverage losses caused by management in
the planning stages unless the loss was caused by an active mal-
function of the product or operation. For example, where an auto-
mobile suspension system is negligently designed so as to cause
81 Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pacific Emp. Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 920 (1953); Waterman S. S. Co. v. Snow,
222 F. Supp. 892 (D. Ore. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 331 F.2d 852 (9th
Cir. 1964); Eastcoast Equipment Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 207 Pa.
Super. 383, 218 A.2d 91 (1966).
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the driver to lose control at certain speeds this would be an error
in the planning stage, but would fall within the exception as to
active malfunction of the product.
Although this provision received much attention when it came
out there are no reported cases construing it. This is somewhat
surprising because it is certainly no mean task to decide whether
a mistake or error was made in the planning stage in many busi-
nesses since the planning and production stages are inextricably
intertwined. The decision as to when a product or operation actively
malfunctions is no less fraught with difficulty. 2 For example, in
a recent California case8 3 a manufacturer was sued for defective
design of an earth moving machine. The machine was built in such
a way that the driver could not see behind him and a workman was
killed when the machine was backed over him. The manufacturer
was allegedly negligent in failing to install a rear view mirror so
that the driver could see behind him and in failing to have an audi-
ble warning device so fellow employees would know the machine
was moving in reverse. Was this injury caused by an active mal-
function of the machine? The product was not malfunctioning in
the sense that it was properly performing the work of spreading
and tamping earth as it was designed to do. When viewing it from
a broader perspective, however, it can be argued that it was not
capable of performing the work without creating unreasonable
risks and thus it was malfunctioning in that sense. From here one
can go on to ponder the harder question of when a "malfunction"
is active as opposed to inactive. Without pursuing the matter fur-
ther, it can readily be seen that there are many tortious acts which
will cause difficulty in the application of this provision. More im-
portant than this, however, is the question of whether the insurance
industry should attempt such an exclusion in the first place.
In order to raise the issue more precisely, imagine the situation
where a person injures himself by moving his body against a
negligently designed sharp or pointed portion of a product, which
is stationary at the time of the accident, such as an automobile
bumper, door handle, or window glass. These defects were, by as-
sumption, created in the planning stage and one would be hard
pressed to rationalize the injuries into the category of resulting
from an active malfunction of the product. Thus, they would ap-
pear to be excluded. Why should one not be allowed to insure
against such risks to persons and property evolving from the plan-
82 For a discussion of some potential problems under this provision,
see Sorensen, What A Lawyer Ought to Know About Products Liability
Insurance Coverage, 1968 Tsmi LAWyERS GumE 322.
83 Pike v. Frank G. Hough, 2 Cal. 3d 465, 85 Cal Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229
(1970).
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ning stage? It is submitted that there are no tenable distinctions
between errors in planning and production resulting in physical
damage which should prevent one from insuring against the former.
If liability is imposed on the fault basis of negligence, the standard
is one of ordinary care in each situation. If liability is imposed on
a non-fault basis, that is, warranty or strict liability, the reason for
the defect is irrelevant and the question of what stage of the busi-
ness it arose from is likewise irrelevant. 4
The insurance industry evidently feels that the risks of bodily
injury or property damage arising from the planning stage of
business are a business risk of the insured, that is, a responsibility
which he must undertake just as he does for other business deci-
sions. There is, however, a difference between insuring against
economic risks arising from the market place which subject the
businessman to ruin for faulty planning or judgment and risks to
others for bodily injury or property damage arising from faulty
planning or judgment. The former is not the type of loss that we
attempt to shift under our economic system. To do so would seem
to effect an indirect, but drastic change in the system itself. Per-
haps we approach such a change when we deviate from the fault
principle in favor of strict liability as a different moral basis for
shifting the loss is emphasized. The test is no longer one of de-
termining whether an unreasonable risk has been created, but is
best expressed by the rhetorical question: "Who shall pay when the
benefits to the many come at a high cost to the few?" This emerg-
ing theory of products liability is based on the concept that the
supplier is best able to distribute losses arising from defective or
unreasonably dangerous products, thus making him an initial in-
surer. But this is limited to physical damage, as under the fault
basis, and does not extend to all economic loss. The process at the
planning stage out of which defectively designed or otherwise de-
ficient work is produced may be the same as where a "business"
decision is made which subjects the supplier to financial risks aris-
ing from our exchange oriented economic system. It is the conse-
quences of this process and not the process itself which should
concern the insurers. It is the imposition of liability for physical
damage caused by deficient work placed in the stream of commerce
and not the stage of business organization out of which the defi-
ciency arises that is of concern. This would seem to hold true re-
84 Id. at 477, 85 Cal Rptr. at 637, 467 P.2d at 237 (where the court
recognized that strict products liability may be imposed for defects
in design and that there is no reason to attempt a distinction based
on the source of the defect).
85 Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Require-
ment of a Defect, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 855, 867 (1963).
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gardless of whether the product or work is defective or unreason-
ably dangerous. Suppliers should not be obliged to assume tort
liability for damages without the opportunity to, in effect, re-insure.
Thus, the insurance industry would do well to eliminate the "Busi-
ness Risk" exclusion from the policy.
III. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OTHER THAN THE
PRODUCT OR WORK ITSELF
The products hazard and completed operations provisions are
not intended to cover damage to the insured's products or work
project out of which an accident arises.8 6 The risk intended to be
insured is the possibility that the goods, products or work of the
insured, once relinquished or completed, will cause bodily injury
or damage to property other than to the product or completed work
itself, and for which the insured may be found liable. The insured,
as a source of goods or services, may be liable as a matter of con-
tract law to make good on products or work which is defective or
otherwise unsuitable because it is lacking in some capacity. This
may even extend to an obligation to completely replace or rebuild
the deficient product or work. This liability, however, is not what
the coverages in question are designed to protect against. The cov-
erage is for tort liability for physical damages to others and not for
contractual liability of the insured for economic loss because the
product or completed work is not that for which the damaged per-
son bargained.8 7
This limitation on the type of property damage covered was ex-
pressed in the policies prior to 1966 by language which excluded
coverage for injury to or destruction of "any goods, products or
containers thereof manufactured, sold, handled or distributed or
premises alienated by the named insured, or work completed by or
for the named insured, out of which the accident arises."138 Where
a product or work project was looked upon as an undivided whole
there was little difficulty in the application of this provision. For
88 Andersen, Current Problems in Products Liability Law and Products
Liability Insurance, 31 INs. CouNsEL J. 436, 443 (1964).
87 See Aetna Ins. Co. v. State Motors, Inc., 109 N.H. 120, 244 A.2d 64
(1968) where the insured represented that certain cars were fit for
use as taxi cabs. The representations proved to be false, and the cus-
tomer sued the insured for damages for repair and replacement costs,
loss of use, loss of business, injury to reputation, inconvenience and
other losses. The court held there was no coverage under the policy
which clearly stated that there had to be physical injury to tangible
property other than to the insured's goods or products before there
would be coverage.
88 See 1 CCH PRonucTs LIxA. REP. 3550 (1970).
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example, where a grain elevator developed leaks89 or collapsed 0
or where a foundation wall on a home collapsed 9' it was clear that
the damage to the work product was caused by an accident or oc-
currence arising out of the work itself.92 Conversely, where the
product or work project resulted in physical damage to property
which was clearly independent of and unrelated to the product it-
self there was little problem.
Not all products, however, were looked upon as an undivided
whole, but were considered by some courts as being comprised of
components. Where this view was taken a question arose as to
whether the insurer would be liable for damages caused to one
component by another component.93 In S. L. Rowland Construction
Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.,94 the insurer was
held liable under the products hazard and completed operations
coverages for fire damage to a home constructed by the insured
caused by the placement of a joist or header too near the firebox
of a fireplace. The court reasoned that the exclusionary clause in
question did not apply to the entire house as being the product of
the insured, but that it applied only to the component parts thereof
out of which the accident arose. This view was not universally ac-
cepted,9 5 but did cause enough concern to insurers that it was
remedied in 1966. Now the revised standard policy provides that
the products hazard and completed operations provisions do not
apply
89 Employers Cas. Co. v. Brown-McKee, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
90 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Knorpp, 370 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963) (Chapman, J., concurring).
91 McGann v. Hobbs Lumber Co., 150 W. Va. 364, 145 S.E.2d 476 (1965).
92 For other cases where the courts concluded that the damage was to
the product or work itself, see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Harvey W.
Hottel, Inc., 289 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (repairs to air-condition-
ing system); Vof v. Ocean Accid. & Guar. Corp., Ltd., 50 Cal. 2d 373,
325 P.2d 987 (1958) (cost of replacing stucco); Rafeiro v. American
Employer's Ins. Co., 5 Cal. App. 3d 799, 85 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1970) (re-
pair and replacement of defective materials and workmanship);
Bryan Const. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 110 N. J. Super.
181, 264 A.2d 752 (Ch. Div. 1970) (design and construction defects in
building); Waite v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 467 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1970)
(destruction of fairlead, a device over which lines were strung for
the pulling of logs).
93 Even the insurance industry was not sure of the answer to this ques-
tion. See Vof v. Ocean Accid. & Guar. Corp., Ltd., 50 Cal. 2d 373,
380, 325 P.2d 987, 992 (1958) (Carter, J., dissenting).
94 72 Wash. 2d 682, 434 P.2d 725 (1967).
95 The court in Blackfield v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 245 Cal. App. 2d
271, 53 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1966) adopted the view that a house was com-
prised of component parts and if one part damaged other parts then
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(j) to property damage to premises alienated by the named
insured arising out of such premises or any part thereof;
(1) to property damage to the named insured's products aris-
ing out of such products or any part of such products;
(m) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of
the named insured arising out of the work or any portion
thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished
in connection therewith ....
Another problem with the pre-1966 version of the exclusion in
question, which was much more serious, arose in regard to deficient
products or work which did not cause physical damage, as such,
to other property, but, when used in connection with other prop-
erty, adversely affected the value or use of the other property. In
1954 the Minnesota Supreme Court had before it a case96 where
the insured sold plaster to a contractor who, in turn, applied it
to the wall of a hospital the latter was constructing. The plaster
shrank and cracked and had to be replaced by the contractor. The
contractor sued the insured for breach of warranty and the insured
brought an action for declaratory judgment against its insurer
who had refused to defend. The court rejected the argument that
the plaster lost its identity as goods or a product after it had been
applied to the wall and ceiling of the building, but did hold that
the building had sustained damage by way of a lower market
value and that this was covered by the policy.97 This decision led
other courts to apply the same analysis and come to the same con-
clusion in other cases where the product was used in close connec-
tion with other property.98 One of the most perplexing situations
the damage to the latter was not excluded. For courts expressly re-
jecting this view, see Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 311 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (construction of tramway);
Kendall Plumbing, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 189 Kan. 528,
370 P.2d 396 (1962) (installation of electrical refrigeration system).
See also Home Indem. Co. v. Miller, 399 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1968); Li-
berty Building Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 583, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1960); Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co.,
179 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1965); all of which involved home construc-
tion situations.
9 Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65
N.W.2d 122 (1954).
97 The measure of damages was held to be "the diminution in the market
value of the building, or the cost of removing the defective plaster and
restoring the building to its former condition plus any loss from de-
prival of use, whichever is the lesser." Id. at 358, 65 N.W.2d at 125.
98 See Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 364 F.2d 246
(3d Cir. 1966) (diminution in market value of building due to discolor-
ation and separation of asbestos felt bonded onto steel sheets used in
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in this regard arose in connection with the seed cases. In one case
an insured supplied a variety of wheat seed less productive than
that ordered and the court held that the prospective wheat crop
was not merely the seed in changed form and thus excluded, but
that, by virtue of the germination process, a transformation took
place so as to constitute the wheat crop a separate and distinct
entity from the original seed wheat.9 9 The insurer was held liable
for the diminution in the wheat crop. In another case, an insured
sold cranberry seed beans which were not suitable for the growing
conditions where the beans were intended to be planted.10 0 The
insurer was held liable for the market value of the loss of use of
the land where the beans were planted when they failed to germin-
ate. Suffice it to say that the insurance industry had not expected
to provide coverage for commercial law type damages arising out
of a breach of a sales warranty under the products hazard and
completed operations provisions.' 10
Under the pre-1966 versions of the products hazard and com-
pleted operations provisions it was not clearly stated in the policies
that consequential damages to other property as a result of defi-
cient products or work without physical damage was not covered,
as contended by the insurers. This the insurance industry has
construction of the building); Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indem. Co.,
298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962) (cost of reconstructing defective radiant
heating units installed in concrete floors of houses); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960) (cost of
refurbishing venetian blinds when paint sold by insured and applied
to the blinds flaked and peeled off); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint
Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959) (cost
of removal of defective doors and loss of use of houses in which the
doors were installed); Beacon Textiles Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 355 Mass. 643, 246 N.E.2d 671 (1969) (cost of manufacturing
sweaters from yarn which proved to be defective); Ramco, Inc. v.
Pacific Ins. Co., 249 Ore. 666, 439 P.2d 1002 (1968) (loss of motel busi-
ness due to defective electric baseboard heaters); Dakota Block Co.
v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 81 S.D. 213, 132 N.W.2d 826 (1965) (di-
minution in market value of building due to fading, discoloring and
cracking of exterior walls).
99 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361
(8th Cir. 1966).
100 Economy Mills of Elwell, Inc. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Mich. App.
451, 154 N.W.2d 659 (1967).
101 Some courts refused recovery in the seed cases on the grounds that
there was no "accident" which caused an injury or damages to prop-
erty. Stevens Industries, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 391 F.2d 411 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U. S. 926 (1968); E. K. Hardison Seed Co. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 56 Tenn. App. 644, 410 S.W.2d 729 (1967); St.
Paul-Mercury Ins. Co. v. Sugarland Industries, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 778
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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sought to clarify in the revised standard policies by providing
that "damages" includes the loss of use of property resulting from
property damage, and then defining "property damage" to mean
"injury to or destruction of tangible property." By this it is in-
tended that consequential damages such as loss of use, loss of good
-will, or dirinution in market value will be covered if there is
physical damage to tangible property other than the product or
completed work, but that such consequential damages alone, with-
out physical damage to other property caused by the product or
completed work, will not be covered.
Lastly, it should be noted that the cost of withdrawing defective
or deficient products or work from the market, which can be sub-
stantial, is not covered by the products hazard or completed opera-
tions provisions as the revised standard policy has an express ex-
clusion in regard
(n) to damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair,
replacement, or loss of use of the named insured's products
or work completed by or for the named insured or of any
property of which such products or work form a part, if
such products, work or property are withdrawn from the
market or from use because of any known or suspected
defect or deficiency therein ....
This is true even though the policy also makes it a condition of the
insurer's liability that the insured "shall promptly take at his ex-
pense all reasonable steps to prevent other bodily injury or prop-
erty damage from arising out of the same or similar conditions,
but such expense shall not be recoverable under this policy." This
is the so-called sistership exclusion, and, as has been noted,10 2 a
void has been created in available insurance coverage by virtue of
this exclusion.103
102 Sorensen, supra note 82, at 325.
103 Evidently very few insurance companies are providing any coverage
at all for products withdrawal expense. The author has found only
one such policy and that was offered by the Fireman's Fund Ameri-
can group which provided coverage for expenses paid by the insured
for the withdrawal of products named in the declarations where
such withdrawal is made necessary by reason of determination by
the insured or by any ruling of any governmental body that the use
or consumption of such products shall result in bodily injury, sick-
ness, disease, or death solely because of error or inadvertent omission
in the manufacture or labeling of products. The author has been un-
able to find any insurer offering such a policy covering property
damage. Perhaps an insurer such as Lloyd's of London would under-
write coverage for withdrawal expense on an individual basis.
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IV. CONCLUSION
To date there have been no reported cases construing the 1966
revised standard products hazard and completed operations pro-
visions. In order to clarify the intent behind these provisions em-
phasis has been placed on analyzing and categorizing the problems
and relevant judicial opinions concerning prior versions of these
provisions. By approaching the subject in this manner, it is hoped
that the resolution of future disputes, which are inevitable, will
be facilitated. There is still, however, no substitute for familiarizing
oneself with the details of a particular policy. This is most crucial
in preventative law practice so that the client can be assured of
receiving the protection he needs prior to a loss rather than search-
ing the policy afterwards in an attempt to find coverage. Again,
it is hoped that this article will be of assistance to counsel in that
process, too.
